What will happen to “one country, two systems” when the Basic Law expires?
By Yannie Chan | Oct 02, 2014
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On July 1, 2047, Hong Kong runs out. Just 33 years from now the promise that Hong Kong’s “previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years” comes to a close. The Sino-British Joint Declaration, which promised Hong Kong “a high degree of autonomy” and “an independent judiciary” may no longer be legally binding. Changes to the Basic Law, which outlines the city’s political, legislative and legal structure and provides protection for fundamental human rights, will become possible. In other words: Beijing can do whatever the hell they want.
That doesn’t seem to be an idea that makes many people happy, as we’ve learned all the more clearly over the past week. And it’s not that far away, either. Are you thinking of buying a flat in the next 10 years? Your mortgage will likely overlap with the 2047 transition. The last time Hong Kong faced being taken over by China, it led to a confidence crisis and thousands fled the city. Since 1997 then Hongkongers have developed far more of their own fractious identity: proudly individual and proudly resistant to mainland interference. In the 1980s Hong Kong was a global powerhouse that the rest of China could only dream of—these days the motherland is home to the world’s second largest economy. This time around, there’s no sanction, no bargaining chip. What are we going to negotiate with three decades down the line?
If the way things played out before 1997 is any indication, people will start getting worried about land and political instability around 2030—just 16 years away—and we’ll likely have a good grasp of Hong Kong’s fate a few years after that. But what is actually going to happen? Will there be tanks in the streets, or will everything just float along like before? Here are the four most likely scenarios.
What happens? Beijing agrees to extend the Basic Law as it currently stands. “One country, two systems” continues to operate in Hong Kong. July 1, 2047 will just be another day. Why could it happen? This goes back to how people interpret the original purpose of “one country, two systems.” Instead of an expiration date, there’s an argument to be made that the 50-year window was actually chosen for symbolic purposes, not as a ticking time bomb. Speaking during a 1988 international conference on the future of China, Deng Xiaoping—the statesman who masterminded the “one country, two systems” concept—said as much. “50 years is only a vivid way of putting it. Even after 50 years, our policy will not change either. That is, for the first 50 years it cannot be changed and for the second there will be no need to change it.”
What are the chances? Albert Chen Hung-yee, the Chan Professor in Constitutional Law at HKU and a member of the Committee for the Basic Law, says that renewal of the Basic Law is a real possibility. “If things are working well in the period of about 10 years before 2047, people will want the arrangement to continue,” Chen says. “It depends on whether Hong Kong can continue to be politically stable and economically prosperous, because stability and prosperity are the original aims of ‘one country, two systems.’”
Beijing’s attitude since taking control of Hong Kong points to a considerable reluctance to make big changes to the Basic Law, says Danny Gittings, an ex-journalist who’s now a legal academic at HKU and the author of “Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law,” which contains a chapter investigating what might happen post-2047. “The central authority has been reluctant to meddle in the details of the Basic Law, except for urgent matters like electoral reform,” says Gittings. “It’s been 17 years since the handover, and there has been no amendment to the main text of the Basic Law.”
There’s also the Taiwan factor. Deng originally devised “one country, two systems” to lure Taiwan into reunification, without success. The arrangement was then adapted to Hong Kong. “Hong Kong remains a demonstration model of ‘one country, two systems’ for Taiwan,” explains Sonny Lo Shiu-hing, co-director of the Centre for Governance and Citizenship at the HK Institute of Education. “So long as Taiwan and China have not reunited in any form, the central leadership will be more willing to keep ‘one country, two systems’ intact.”
Standing in the way is Hongkongers’ failure to understand China, argues Sonny Lo. “Many people underestimated the National People’s Congress Standing Congress [before they issued their white paper on electoral reform], and panicked when the heavy-handed decision was announced.” says Lo. “If we do not consider scenarios after 2047 and continue to resist China without considering how to adapt to deeper integration, it could lead China to adopt a more top-down model.”
Andrew Li, former chief justice
“I am optimistic that as long as all those concerned appreciate that one country as well as two systems are integral parts of the formula, we can continue after 2047 to maintain our own separate system based on respect for human dignity, with our own core values and our freedoms.”
What happens? The government uses the 2047 transition as a chance to amend outdated provisions. Aided by politicians, it begins a consultation process to reform problematic aspects of the Basic Law. Hong Kong becomes even better... that is, if Beijing doesn’t also suggest changes they would like to see.
Why could it happen? Not everyone looks on 2047 with dread. The Basic Law isn’t perfect, and 2047 could be a great chance to improve it. For example, Chief Secretary Carrie Lam looked to 2047 as an opportunity for change when she was still Secretary for Development, in 2012. She spoke of a possible revision to the controversial Small House Policy, which grants every male indigenous villager of the New Territories the right to build a house. Though widely exploited by property developers, the policy is currently accepted to be a right guaranteed under Article 40 of the Basic Law.
Another potential boost to Hong Kong is to update the guarantee that Hong Kong will operate its separate currency under the Joint Declaration. Back in 1984, the Chinese economy was horrible, and it would have been a disaster for Hong Kong to adopt the Renminbi, and so the Hong Kong Dollar was codified in the Basic Law. But today, some argue that the city could benefit from a new currency policy. Albert Chen from HKU’s Department of Law has suggested that this situation could be up for debate by 2047.
What are the chances? “This is certainly the most desirable scenario of all,” says Danny Gittings. “You can see the logic—there are things that would be helpful to change.” But this comes with a fairly tough prerequisite: the HKSAR government needs to be effective and it needs to get along with Beijing. “These beneficial changes would have to be initiated mostly through the Chief Executive, who has to collect these demands, take them to Beijing and negotiate with them,” says Gittings. “It’s too far into the future to say, but based on the current political climate, where you do not have consensus on pivotal issues, I would say that’s not very likely to happen.”
Another problem, of course: If we have a list of requests, Beijing is sure to has its list as well. “Once you start making some changes, you don’t know where it’s going to stop,” Gittings says. “That’s the danger.”
Wang Zhenmin, Tsinghua University law dean
“Hong Kong needs democracy to maintain its stability and prosperity.”
Li Fei, National People’s Congress Standing Committee deputy secretary-general
and Basic Law Committee chairman
“If Hong Kong’s Chief Executive opposes the central government, then “two systems” fails and “one country, two systems” will come to an end.”
Read HK Magazine's Editor-in-Chief Zach Hines's take that we should "pocket" Beijing's offer.
What happens? Beijing introduces significant modifications to fundamentally undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy. The court of final appeal is relocated to the region’s capital, Guangzhou—or perhaps to Beijing. No more freedom of speech, press and assembly. You can be arrested for “inciting subversion of the state’s political power.” Hong Kong is integrated more fully into the mainland China politically, economically, socially and culturally. It might still be called “one country, two systems”, but that’s doublespeak: it’s really one country, one system.
Why could it happen? Without any internationally binding agreement remaining on the operation of “one country, two systems,” the first thing that Beijing will be tempted to undermine is Hong Kong’s rule of law, particularly the SAR’s power of final adjudication: “It’s something that Chinese scholars have sometimes complained about,” Danny Gittings says. “It’s very unusual for places in the same country to have independent courts.” Beijing’s recent white paper on “one country, two systems” already shows the CPC’s wariness of the independence of the city’s judges, with its controversial comment that “the basic political requirement” of members of the government, including judges, is “loving the country.”
Robert J. Morris, a legal scholar at the University of Hong Kong, argues that the endpoint of “one country, two systems” is “the complete absorption of Hong Kong” into the mainland, as the arrangement is dialectic in nature—meaning that it’s designed to resolve disagreement between two points of view. But “there is no protection for Hong Kong in the Basic Law,” says Morris. Beijing’s point of view is the only one that can hold sway. Kenneth Chan Ka-lok, a Civic Party lawmaker and an associate professor in international politics at the Hong Kong Baptist University, agrees. “It’s clear to me that the current leaders have grown less and less confident about Hong Kong and how Hong Kong’s democratization may or may not benefit China’s own political changes,” says Chan. “It would be in Beijing’s best interests for Hong Kong to peacefully converge.”
The Liaison Office’s increasing visibility in the city’s politics is another warning sign. “The center of the whole strategy is of course the Liaison Office,” says Chan. “It’s like a government, with ministers and thousands of employees. It’s been very involved in our local elections.” During the 2012 Chief Executive election, it was widely reported that the Liaison Office began a campaign to secure more votes for CY Leung: more than 40 members of the Electoral Committee confirmed to the SCMP that the Liaison Office had asked them to switch sides. The day after his win, CY Leung made a 90-minute visit to the Liaison Office, drawing criticism that he was allowing Beijing to meddle in local affairs.
What are the chances? Both Morris and Chan believe that there won’t be outright amendments to the Basic Law: if China wants to assimilate Hong Kong, it doesn’t have to bother. “For a one-party dictatorship like China, it’s very easy to replace and subvert the law with policy declarations or political statements,” says Chan. “There’s no need to amend the Basic Law.” Case in point: Chinese officials had previously promised that Hong Kong could decide its own electoral reforms, but it disregarded that promise when the National People’s Congress’ Standing Committee took the reins by deciding on a timeline for elections in 2004, and then set further guidelines on the 2017 Chief Executive election this year. The white paper issued by Beijing in June, for example, has stated that Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” is subject to how much the central leadership is willing to allow.
Even veteran democrat politician Martin Lee Chu-ming, who was on the Basic Law’s drafting committee, says the original purpose of “one country, two systems” has been lost. From working up close with Deng Xiaoping, Lee believes the former leader had hoped that by 2047, China would have caught up with Hong Kong. “Deng had a vision: he saw that for China to become successful, it needed to be more like Hong Kong, and not go down the path of the Soviet Union,” says Lee. “The current leaders are on the wrong track, destroying our core values just so that it’ll be easier for them to control Hong Kong.”
Lee believes that the question of 2047 is no longer relevant. Instead, Hong Kong’s future depends on whether Chinese President Xi Jinping will change his mind about Hong Kong. “If not, the battle is over,” Lee concedes. “If the Liaison Office really wanted to influence Hong Kong’s judges and attack the independent judicial system, it’d be quick and easy.” But Lee remains hopeful. “In the past dozen years, Xi has been the only president taking up the fight against corruption and making progress.” Lee says. “It remains to be seen whether he just wants all the power to himself, or if he plans to make changes to China after consolidating his power.”
Zhang Rongshun, vice-chairman of the
NPC Standing Committee’s legislative affairs commission
"The central government has the power to monitor Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy. This […] is not an overstatement, but an understatement.”
Deng Xiaoping, former Chinese leader
and mastermind behind “one country, two systems."
"Is universal suffrage certainly favorable for Hong Kong? I don’t believe that. A Hongkonger who loves the country and Hong Kong should be managing Hong Kong affairs. Can universal suffrage ensure someone as such will be chosen?”
Here's what you need to know if you're thinking about leaving Hong Kong.
What happens? The Basic Law expires, and Hong Kong is folded into China. No more Special Administrative Region, no more special privileges. Hong Kong becomes a third-tier mainland city, Beijing sends in the tanks and the police will be taken over by the People’s Armed Police. Burn your HKSAR passport.
What are the chances? Nah. No one believes that this is actually plausible. After all, Hong Kong isn’t really that much of a priority for Beijing. What with the Tibetan separatists, Xinjiang terrorists, Japanese border disputes, internal corruption and the Taiwan problem, China isn’t looking for more trouble in the HKSAR. There are also easier ways to quietly turn Hong Kong than canceling the SAR: the gradual process of undermining the rule of law will take care of that. Or, failing that, tear gas should do the trick.
Elsie Leung, Basic Law Committee vice-chairwoman and former Secretary for Justice
”Hongkongers still haven’t accepted the fact that after the handover, Hong Kong is a direct-controlled municipality of China.”
http://m.hk-magazine.com/city-living/article/end-hong-kong