By QITONG CAO
OCTOBER 30, 2014
Street protests for free elections in Hong Kong have now stretched into a second month, and there is no sign of resolution. The movement, known as Occupy Central With Love and Peace, is demanding changes to the restrictive framework Beijing has imposed for the election of Hong Kong’s next leader, the chief executive, in 2017. The protesters fear that the election guidelines issued by China’s legislature will ensure that only candidates approved by Beijing will appear on the ballot. But no concessions have been forthcoming from the government, and some wonder how long the civil disobedience campaign can be sustained and what it might achieve.
Larry Diamond, a political sociologist specializing in democracy studies, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and directs the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute. There he served as thesis adviser to Regina Ip, a pro-Beijing Hong Kong lawmaker and the city’s former security chief, a post she resigned in 2003 after the government’s push to pass antisubversion legislation led to major protests. (More recently, Ms. Ip has been one of the few pro-establishment figures to seek meetings with Occupy Central leaders to find a way to end the demonstrations.)
In an interview, Mr. Diamond discussed the prospects for political liberalization in Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland. Excerpts follow:
Q.
Do the protesters have any bargaining chips in dealing with the government right now?
A.
It is good that the Hong Kong government and the protesters have talked to one another, and of course it is deeply disturbing that force has again been used against some of the demonstrators, but this has not yet happened on anything like the scale that is possible if the Beijing authorities should decide to impose a complete crackdown.
Negotiations should always be pursued when there is a dangerous stalemate, and that is what prevails in Hong Kong now. I have been saying for several years now that there are a variety of interesting options for moving toward the fully democratic, open election of the chief executive, and Hong Kongers have floated these. Indeed, Regina Ip did so in her master’s thesis some years ago.
Just as one example, Hong Kong could enlarge the nominating committee [currently stacked with delegates loyal to Beijing] considerably, make it much more inclusive, and lower the threshold for nomination from a majority to 10 or 15 percent. If the government were to offer a serious compromise formula, one could imagine the protesters backing down from their demand for civic nomination in 2017 and negotiating a more modest reform that would still be likely to produce a genuinely competitive election for chief executive. But the government is offering nothing in the way of real democratic reform.
I think that the protesters, the students and their sympathizers, are in a relatively weak bargaining position, particularly with the central government, somewhat stronger with respect to the local government. So what’s their bargaining chip? The bargaining chip is the ability to continue to disrupt the economic activity and normal functioning of governmental and economic life in Hong Kong. And this is potentially painful and threatening to the local government in Hong Kong, and to a greater extent, the business and banking community in Hong Kong.
Such an analysis might suggest that it is possible that the students are talking to the wrong people. They need to be talking to a wide range of established business and professional interests in Hong Kong. I don’t see how the students are going to move [Hong Kong Chief Executive] C.Y. Leung and his government. But they might get other established Hong Kong interests to realize that democratic reform is necessary and does not need to threaten their vital interests.
On the other hand, if you consider Beijing’s highest priority in Hong Kong, it is to ensure that Hong Kong does not establish a model or precedent that would become subversive of the authority of the Communist Party in the rest of China by inspiring demands for democratic change. There the students don’t have any bargaining chip with the central government, because the central government would rather allow ongoing protest, economic decay or even semi-military repression in Hong Kong than allow meaningful democratization in Hong Kong. That is my reading of the way that the central government is now thinking about Hong Kong.
It’s that almost any outcome would be better than democratization in Hong Kong because of their perception, I think somewhat erroneous, that it would have subversive diffusion effects in the rest of China. So if that’s the attitude of central government authorities in Beijing, how do you negotiate with that?
Q.
How do you view the protests in the long term?
A.
I think that the fundamental issue is beyond any resolution in the foreseeable future. What should the students and other pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong do? I fear that if they just keep blocking the streets indefinitely, people will grow more and more tired of the disruption, and even many of those in Hong Kong who truly want democratic reform will grow weary and even irritated. There are some signs that this has begun to happen, and the government may thus think that time is on its side. Pro-democracy forces may thus opt to explore other forms of nonviolent civil resistance that can be sustained for the longer run, rather than keep occupying the streets.
The bottom line of much literature on nonviolent resistance is that tactical and strategic understanding and organizational skills and adaptability are extremely important, maybe more important than outside structural conditions, in determining whether a movement will succeed.
Q.
So far, the mainland Chinese public, especially the younger generation, has generally not been sympathetic to the Hong Kong protesters. Is people’s desire for democracy in China shrinking?
A.
I don’t think there is any evidence that the desire for democracy in China is shrinking. The limited public opinion survey evidence we have — from the Asian Barometer — suggests that it’s growing, but gradually. In particular, it appears that the desire is for more open and accountable government, and for more freedom and autonomy — and for more elements of popular sovereignty, maybe not democracy per se. These attitudes and values are growing, but gradually, in China, and they’ll probably continue to grow, only gradually, maybe even very slowly, until there’s some crisis.
I think that it’s too soon to judge what the impact of the protests in Hong Kong is going to be on political thinking and political life in China in the longer run. What we see is visible demonstrations and articulations by people who are saying, in a very outspoken way, “This is destabilizing. This is not what we want for China.” They express in various ways a lack of sympathy for the protesters. People who are saying anything at all may be saying something negative.
But what about other people who are watching this and not saying anything publicly, or not posting anything on their web page but maybe are being deeply affected by this? I think there are a lot of people who are getting some sense of what is happening from social media and public media, and I think the news is still getting out. So there may be more people affected by this in China than may be conventionally understood.
Q.
Are you concerned that without changes to the election rules granting greater democracy, popular resentment in Hong Kong against mainland China will increase?
A.
It’s possible and I don’t think it will be a healthy development. I think it’s important that the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong — and that includes students who are demanding democracy — remain disciplined and careful in their use of language. Discipline means avoiding violence but also means avoiding any implications of chaos. The students have been very shrewd, and I think laudable, in their restraint by very simple things. They have been very meticulous about picking up the trash from their demonstrations, and even then taking the trash and separating out the recyclables. First of all it’s idealistic. It shows their respect for their urban environment. But also it shows some discipline and order that they make sure that they are respectful to the community.
So I think it’s very important for the Hong Kong protesters to continue to show discipline and order. The same thing is important rhetorically — that they not become abusive in their language, that they not become abusive toward people who are maybe getting impatient with them, but just keep quietly and persistently restating why they’re doing this and what their principles are and so on. They should show respect to people who disagree with them and a desire not to inconvenience people. They should be very careful to avoid language that would suggest a lack of respect for the People’s Republic of China or a failure to identify with or accept their citizenship in the People’s Republic of China.
This is the image that is being portrayed of them [in Chinese state media] — that the protesters are a bunch of irresponsible scumbags who only care about themselves and don’t respect China. It is very important that the protesters not give the government an excuse to dismiss them or arrest them.
Larry Diamond.
JOHANNA WEE / HENRY HOLT
Pro-democracy protesters camped outside Hong Kong government headquarters.
KIN CHEUNG / ASSOCIATED PRESS
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