The battlefield tactics of Zhang Dejiang
Beijing’s good cop-bad cop personas are both in play. They’re old school but may not be effective this time.
Originally written by Johnny Lau in Chinese, translated by Harbour Times journalist, Cassy Chau.
Recently, the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and Beijing's man in charge of Hong Kong affairs, Zhang Dejiang, held meetings with CY Leung, principal officials of HKSAR, as well as pro-establishment leaders in Shenzhen. This act emphasised Beijing’s sincerity on moving Hong Kong towards universal suffrage. Some questions are worth asking: Why does Beijing follow these tactics? How effective are they?
Insiders claim these actions are nothing new. In recent years, Mainland publishers have produced books about how early Communists, emerging from their rural strongholds, took over large cities and consolidated their hold on China. They disclose methods similar to policies being used to rule Hong Kong now. I would recommend you to examine these books to know the tactics Zhang Dejiang used in this Shenzhen trip and the long-term tactics Beijing is using to handle problems in Hong Kong. People inside the circle called this “all-round 3D tactics” (全方位的立體戰術).
Softly, softly
Both hard and soft tactics are adopted. At this stage, soft tactics come first and hard tactics come later. The next step is to abandon the soft tactics and slowly press harder and harder.
Zhang Dejiang’s Shenzhen trip is intended to give Hong Kong people an impression that Beijing is willing to come down to their level. The Central government did not summon principal officials and the pro-establishment camp to receive orders in Beijing, but neither did it come to Hong Kong like a sovereign descending on his domain, but rather “listened to Hong Kong citizens’ views” in Shenzhen.
Some scandals are based on facts, some are fabricated. What matters most is a strong propaganda machine.
Beijing hopes to treat Hong Kong representatives with politeness, try fair means before resorting to force, and minimise resistance from pro-democrats and citizens so it can take the next step forward in reform. Nevertheless, society is not only concerned about the public conversation, but also the conversation with CY Leung and senior officials. Rumors inside the circle claim that critical content is still intensely private; for example, Zhang Dejiang’s inquiries into the Hong Kong police and “foreign forces”.
Hard and harder
After displaying soft tactics, Beijing did not neglect hard tactics. However, the one to play the tough guy role is not the Administration, but rather the pro-establishment members. For example, they warned that Hong Kong people should not fight against Beijing, otherwise they could only “die”. Beijing can control Hong Kong’s economy; If Hong Kong “dies”, there is still Shanghai. These sayings are common recently. The suggestion is Hong Kong people can not blame Central Government for not playing nice if Hong Kongers are still so stubborn.
Dig and fling
On the other hand, in this period during Zhang’s trip, waves of scandalous information were released and directed at opponents such as Jimmy Lai and targeted democrats. This is exactly how the Chinese government took over big cities in the early administrative stages post 1949. Those who are willing to submit will be fine, but dirt will be dug out to smear those who are not willing to accommodate the new regime. Some scandals are based on facts, some are fabricated. What matters most is a strong propaganda machine. In fact, collecting information is a long-adopted practice to understand enemies. Information is collected for years and used once “needed”.
Rumorus include unbelievably detailed information about opposition factions. In addition to basic information on the person involved (such as their contact number, home and work address, educational background and work experience), it also includes the person’s and their family members’ (spouse, children or close relatives) personal information, bank accounts, their life in University, or even the title of their graduation papers. No illegal or immoral acts are excluded. This kind of “digging the old dirt” is very common. Most of the democrats in Mainland and those intellectuals who opposed the Central Government have had the same experience, now and then.
Rally the troops
Rallying public support is a clear objective. The recent “anti-Occupy Central campaign” is an illustration of such a tactic. It is well-organised, systematic and has a clear objective.
a message to ‘foreign interests” that wish to maintain a good bilateral relationship with China: Back off.
In addition, warning nations not to interfere with the affairs of Hong Kong is another aspect of the comprehensive range of tactics which China uses. It sends a message to ‘foreign interests” that wish to maintain a good bilateral relationship with China: Back off.
From the viewpoint of realpolitik, these tactics and actions are not uncommon and hardly deserve a big fuss. People are generally better judges than they are given credit for. It will not bring any good to either Hong Kong nor the mainland if Beijing continues its repressive approach and over-reaction to the dissidents here in the SAR. There might be room for compromise but we will not be seeing it in near future as both sides will not relax their stances until the very end of the constitutional reform negotiation (if both sides even want a compromise at all). However, judging by the current situation, I worry that things will go astray and beyond the control of Beijing. The worst case is seeing a tragedy befall both Hong Kong and mainland if that happens.
Johnny Lau is a well-known commentator on a range of topics, especially on the Hong Kong-China nexus. He is the worker for Wen Wei Po from 1972 to 1989, where he retired as Bureau Chief. He is now a lecturer and China relations consultant and has been a mainstay of Hong Kong media for over 40 years.
